In the game of Matching Pennies, Alice and Bob each hold a penny, and at every tick of the clock they simultaneously display the head or the tail sides of their coins. If they both display the same side, then Alice wins Bob's penny; if they display different sides, then Bob wins Alice's penny. To avoid giving the opponent a chance to win, both players seem to have nothing else to do but to randomly play heads and tails with equal frequencies. However, while not losing in this game is easy, not missing an opportunity to win is not. Randomizing your own moves can be made easy. Recognizing when the opponent's moves are not random can be arbitrarily hard.
Introduction

Game of Matching Pennies
The payoff matrix for Matching Pennies is displayed on Table 1 . For the convenience of using the bitstring notations, we denote the heads move as 0 and the tails move as 1. The game is repeated, and we assume that it is played long enough that even the smallest strategic advantages get expressed in the outcome. Both players can win or lose arbitrarily large amounts of pennies.
How not to lose Matching Pennies
To determine her strategy, Alice might reason something like this.
Suppose that I consistently play 1 with a frequency p ∈ [0, 1] and thus 0 with a frequency 1 − p. If I set p < Table 1 : Payoffs for Matching Pennies whether he plays 1 or 0: it is 1 − 2p = 2p − 1 = 0. Since Bob's winnings are my losses, the best strategy for me is to set p = 1 2 , and to play 0 and 1 with equal frequencies, since that minimizes my expected losses.
By the same reasoning, Bob arrives at the same conclusion, that he should set the frequency of playing 1 at q = 1 2 . This is the well known Nash equilibrium of the game of Matching Pennies. Both players arrive to it by minimizing the expected losses.
Playing Matching Pennies
In general, a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium prescribes the frequencies for both players' moves in the long run. The essential assumption is that the moves will be randomized. If Bob's move is predictable with some likelihood, then Alice can increase her chances to win. It seems natural to imagine that the players randomize by tossing their coins, and displaying the random outcomes. At the equilibrium, the players are just passive servants of chance, since they cannot gain anything by deviating from it. If they are rational, all they can do is toss their coins.
But suppose that Bob suddenly plays 0101010101010101010101010101010101010101
Will Alice predict that Bob's next move is 0 and play 0 to win a penny? If she thinks probabilistically, she will probably notice that the probability of getting (1) by flipping a fair coin is 2 −40 , which is exactly the same as the chance of getting, e.g. 1101000100110101001011100100000100000010 (2) or any other sequence that she would accept as random. If Alice's rationality is based on probabilities, then she will not be able to distinguish any two strings of Bob's moves, since they are all equally probable if he tosses fair coins. But if Bob knows or just believes that Alice's rationality is based on probabilities, and that Alice will thus continue to randomize her moves in any case, then Bob has no reason to randomize, since playing (1), or (2), or a string of 0s, or any other string, yield the same expected payoff against Alice's random plays. On the other hand, if Alice believes that Bob's rationality is based on probabilities, then she will also have no reason to randomize, since her payoffs are always the same.
So by combining their beliefs about their probabilistic reasoning, both players will become indifferent towards mixing and randomizing their moves. Their common knowledge that they may both stop randomizing, because they both know that the opponent will be unable to tell, will not change their expected payoffs. Indeed, if they both play non-randomly, one of them will almost surely win and the other will lose, but their chances are the same, and they average out. However, while the expected payoffs remain unchanged, the higher moments will, of course, diverge wildly.
How to win Matching Pennies if you can
In order to exploit Bob's deviation from the equilibrium, or to give him an incentive to genuinely randomize his mixed equilibrium strategy, Alice must go beyond probabilities, i.e. beyond just calculating the frequency of his moves. If she just checks whether the frequencies of 0 and 1 are 1 2 , she will detect that the string consisting 0s alone is not random, but not that the string (1) is not random; if she checks whether the frequencies of 00, 01, 10 and 11 are 1 4 , she will detect that (1) is not random, but not that the string where these four digraphs of bits alternate is not random; etc. By checking that each bitstring of length n has in the long run the frequency 1 2 n , she will detect many non-random plays, but still miss most of them. E.g., the string 0110111001011101000100110101100110111101111 . . .
obtained by concatenating the binary notations for the sequence of natural numbers 0,1,2,3. . . will pass the bias tests for all n-grams, if taken long enough, yet it is, of course, easily predictable, and obviously not random. Moreover, Bob might, e.g., randomize all even bits, and just alternate 0s and 1s at the odd positions. To recognize such opportunities, Alice will have to check that every substring of the string of Bob's past moves has unbiased frequencies of all n-grams. As the game goes on, Alice will thus have to keep proving that Bob's play, i.e. the ever growing string of his past moves, is what von Mises called Kollektiv in his theory of probability [28] . Proving that something is a Kollektiv is known to be a problematic task, as specifying the substrings to be tested has led to problems that remained open for many years [27, 1] .
Randomness from equilibrium
Scratching the surface of the basic assumption about the players' incentives to implement a mixed strategy equilibrium led us straight into the foundationals of probability. There is, of course, nothing very surprising about the fact that the concept of a mixed strategy, expressed in terms of probabilities, depends on the foundations of probability. The point of the story is not so much that there are deep probabilistic problems lurking behind simple games. Although easily ignored, that fact should not be surprising. A more useful point that we would like to make is that, the other way around, there seem to be instructive ways to state the solutions of the foundational problems of probability in terms of games, simple and intuitive.
In particular, we show that the usual way of defining mixed strategy equilibria based on the notion of randomness (and hiding the subtleties and the complexities of this notion under the carpet) can be reversed -and that the notion of randomness can be defined the other way around, using mixed strategy equilibria. The upshot of this is not just that a complicated concept of randomness is replaced by an intuitive game theoretic concept of not losing Matching Pennies at the equilibrium; the upshot is also that the effective content of both concepts, of randomness and of equilibrium, can be analyzed in terms of randomness tests, which bring both probabilistic and game theoretic concepts on the mathematical ground of inductive inference [5, 25, 2, 22, 30] -with a great potential for cross-polination of ideas.
Background and related work
We propose a simple and narrow bridge between games and probabilities. An extensive effort towards reconstructing the foundations of probability theory from a particular game, has been ongoing for many years, as reported by Shafer and Vovk [24] . The work presented in this paper is not only at the opposite end of the scale in terms of its scope and technical sophistication, but it also goes in a different direction, and therefore uses an essentially different model. While the authors of [24] aim to reconstitute the full power of the diverse probabilistic tools in their rich gaming model, the point here is to illustrate how the most basic games capture the most basic probability concepts in a completely natural fashion.
The bridge between games and probabilities is built using significance testing and computation. Significance testing goes back to Fisher [5, 5] and lies, of course, at the core of the method of statistical induction. The constructions sketched here are related to the computational versions of testing, developed on one hand in Martin-Löf's work [15, 17] , and on the other hand in the techniques of inductive learning [6, 2, 29] .
We analyze the computational content of testing. The analyses of the computational content of strategic reasoning go back to the earliest days of game theory [21] , and continue through theory of bounded rationality [23] , and on a broad front of algorithmic game theory [18] . The finite state machine model seems preferred for specifying strategies [23, 9] , since computable strategies lead to problems with the equilibrium constructions [26, 16] . In recent work, a different family of problems, arising from the cost of strategic computations has been analyzed, including the cost of randomization [7, 8] . This led the players to not just lose the incentive to randomize, as in the little story above, but to prefer determinism. Although we are here also looking at the problem of deviating from the equilibrium into non-randomness, we are concerned with a completely different question: How should the opponent recognize and exploit this deviation? The present work seems to deviate from all previous computational approaches to gaming in one essential aspect: we are not analyzing the computations that the players perform to construct or implement their own strategies, or the equilibrium, but the computations that they perform to test the opponents' strategies. This leads into a completely different realm of computability, that emerges from a different aspect of gaming. While the analysis goes through for most models of computation, abstracted away behind a family of computations L (as explained in Sec 2.3), it is perhaps worth pointing out that it leads to different notions of randomness, and that stronger notions of computation lead to stronger notions of randomness.
Outline of the paper
In Sec. 2 we spell out the preliminaries and some notations used in the paper. In Sec. 3 we motivate and explain the simplest case of randomness testing, with respect to the uniform distributions, and describe its application in gaming. In Sec. 4 we construct the universal test that can be constructed when all computable partial functions can be used. Sec. 5 derives as a corrolary the characterization of random strings as the equilibrium plays. In Sec. 6 we describe how to construct randomness tests for arbitrary programmable distributions. Sec. 7 closes the paper with some final comments.
Notations and preliminaries
Monoid of plays
In the games considered in this paper, the set of moves is always ¾ = {0, 1}. We sometimes call 0 heads and 1 tails. A play is a finite string (or list, or vector) of moves x = x 1 x 2 x 3 · · · x m , or y = y 1 y 2 y 3 · · · y n played in a match of a game.
The set of all bitstrings, used to represent plays, is denoted by ¾ * . The empty bitstring is (), and the concatenation of bitstrings is x :: y = x 1 · · · x m y 1 · · · y n constitute the monoid ¾ * , ::, () , which is freely generated by ¾. The monoid structure induces the prefix ordering
and the length measure ℓ : ¾ * −→ N, which is the unique homomorphism from the free monoid over two generators to the free monoid over one generator. The fact that it is a homomorphism means that ℓ() = 0 and ℓ ( x :: y) = ℓ ( x) + ℓ ( y)
We shall also need a bijective pairing −, − : ¾ * ×¾ * −→ ¾ * with the projections
: ¾ * −→ ¾ * , which means that together they satisfy
Using the fact that a free monoid is also cofree, a bijective pairing can be derived from any two disjoint injections ¾ * ֒→ ¾ * . We shall use
where x = x 1 x 2 · · · x m and y = y 1 y 2 · · · y n . The length induces the shift homomorphism
Sets and functions
|X| denotes the number of elements of the set X. A functions f : X → Y is assumed to be total, whereas a partial function is written as h : X ⇁ Y . We write h(x) ↓ to say that the partial function h is defined on the input x, and h(x) ↑ or h(x) =↑ to say that h is undefined on x. Whenever we write h(x) in a formula or a definition, we tacitly assume h(x) ↓, unless specified otherwise.
Programmable functions
We say that f : ¾ * ⇁ ¾ * is L-programmable, or that it is an L-function when it is specified using a programming language L. The intuitions from reader's favorite programming language, practical or theoretical, should do. For a theoretical example, one could take L to be the language of finite state machines. A program could then be either a list of transitions of a Moore or Mealy machine, or a corresponding regular expression [10, 3] . The graphs of programmable functions would be regular languages. A larger family or programmable functions would be obtained from a Turing complete programming language, like Python or Java, or the Turing machines themselves. In the latter case, a program could again be a list of the transitions of the machine. The intermediary solution might be to use computations specified in the language of monoidal computers [19, 20] . In any case, all computable partial functions would be programmable, together with their recursively enumerable graphs.
In all cases, we assume that a program corresponding to a given L-function f : X ⇁ Y is effectively given as a bitstring p f ∈ ¾ * . When the language L is Turing complete, then for all types x and Y there is an L-function υ : ¾ * × X ⇁ Y , the universal evaluator, such that for every L-function f : X ⇁ Y holds f (x) = υ( p f , x) for the suitable program p f and all inputs x ∈ X.
Uniform randomness testing
We focus on Alice's task to detect patterns of non-randomness in Bob's play, which she could exploit to predict his moves. Bob is assumed to be doing the same, observing Alice's play and trying to detect some patterns. But what is a pattern? And what does it mean to detect it?
Intuitively, an object has a pattern if it can be described succinctly, i.e. compressed. E.g. the string (1) can be compressed to (01) 20 in a regular notation, or to for ( i =0; i <20; i ++) { p r i n t 01 } in a programming language like Java. The program to extend (1) The idea that randomness can be defined as incompressibility goes back to Kolmogorov [12] , and further back to the scholastic logical principle known as Occam's Razor, which established the priority of succinct descriptions as inductive hypotheses, as explained by Solomonoff [25] .
Detecting regularity, testing randomness
A detector h is predictive if
where ⊏ is the prefix ordering (4) . A bitstring y is said to be h-regular at the level m ∈ N if
The h-regular bitstrings at each level form the h-regularity sets
which all together form the tower
This tower is what we call the h-test. Remark. Proposition 3.2 says that the chance that an observation y is hregular at the level m decreases exponentially in m. Since this is true for all detectors, the implication is that most bitstrings are irregular: most detectors are eventually rejected, and most bitstrings are accepted as random. This is a formal expression of Laplace's observation that regular objects constitute a null set [13] .
Definition 3.3 The h-regularity degree σ h ( y) is the highest h-regularity level that the bitstring y achieves, i.e.
The h-regularity degree is thus a function σ h : ¾ * −→ N.
Alice tests Bob
Alice uses detectors as tools for hypothesis testing, e.g. in the style of [4, 5] . She tests the hypothesis that Bob's play y is random. She will reject the hypothesis if she finds a detector h such that y is h-regular at a sufficiently high level. So Alice tests Bob by going down the h-test tower H 1 ⊇ H 2 ⊇ · · · , and checking how far is it true that y ∈ H m . This will cease to be true at the level σ h ( y) ≤ ℓ( y). If the number σ h ( y) is high, then y is probably regular, and the hypothesis that it is random should be rejected.
To decide when to reject the randomness hypothesis, Alice first of all stipulates a significance threshold M , and considers the outcome of testing y by h if σ h ( y) ≥ M . Since this significance threshold is the negative logarithm of the usual statistical thresholds, which are usually 1% or 5%, then Alice should presumably take M to be a number between 4 and 7.
If she finds a test that detects a significant degree of regularity in y, then Alice attempts to exploit the detected pattern to gain advantage in the game. If the detector h is predictive, then Alice extends the succinct h-description x of y into a succinct descripton z ⊐ x, from which she extrapolates a prediction h( z) ⊐ y of Bob's future play, and plays h( z) herself, since she wins whenever they play the same.
Note that the definition of predictive detectors implies that σ h (h( z)) ≥ σ h ( y), which means that Alice's choice of possible predictions narrows as the observed bitstrings are getting longer and the regularity levels higher: more significant testing outcomes provide more information about the tested bitstring, and better fitting predictions. The usual problems of statistical inference enter scene. However, statistical tests derived from detectors, as L-programmable functions, also have some very special features, which we consider next.
Universal detector
If the L is the family of all computable partial functions, then it contains a universal evaluator, as explained in Sec. 2. This means that the programs for all detectors can be enumerated. By dovetailig, i.e. executing increasing parts of increasing detectors, we can construct a universal detector, which will eventually detect any pattern that any computable detector can detect. The test derived from the universal detector can be viewed as the universal randomness test. The idea and the first construction goes back to Per Martin-Löf [15] . 
Proposition 4.2 There is a universal L-detector if L is the family of all computable partial functions.
Proof. Let υ : ¾ * × ¾ * ⇁ ¾ * be the universal evaluator. This means that for every computable function f : ¾ * ⇁ ¾ * there is a program p f such that
Then u : ¾ * ⇁ ¾ * is a detector by Def. 3.1. For any detector h : ¾ * ⇁ ¾ * and any bitstring x then holds
where p h is a program encoding h. Using the pairing
Then for c h = 2ℓ ( p h ) + 2 holds
which means that u-regularity at the level m implies h-regularity at the level
. Hence (14) .
Matching Pennies randomness
The notion of randomness as incompressibility, as formalized by Kolmogorov [12] and developed in algorithmic information theory [14] , has been justified by Martin-Löf's proof that incompressible strings are just those that pass all randomness tests [15, 17, 14] . But we have seen that randomness tests are also a part of playing Matching Pennies. The players stay at the equilibrium only as long as their plays pass each other's tests. Whenever a test produces a significant outcome, the randomness hypothesis is rejected, and the players depart from the equilibrium, whether the detected pattern was a real consequence of someone's earlier deviation from the equilibrium, or whether the test overfitted a pattern onto an actually random string. The equilibrium persists only if both player's plays pass both players' tests. 6 General randomness testing
A bitstring y is said to be h P -regular at the level m ∈ N whenever
The h P -regular bitstrings at each level form the h P -regularity sets
The sets
The p-size of h p -regularity sets decreases exponentially with m
The search for non-random patterns, deviating from a given string distribution P , proceeds just like the search for patterns deviating from the uniform distribution in Sec. 3.2. When L is the family of all computable functions, there is a universal detector again, constructed by extending the definition in the proof of Prop. 4.2 in the obvious way.
Concluding remarks
The starting point of this paper was the observation that finding and playing one's own strategy is often much easier than recognizing and understanding other players' strategies. In particular, randomizing is much easier than testing randomness. On the other hand, knowing that the opponent keeps an eye on how you play is necessary for the implementations of many equilibrium concepts, usually assumed implicitly. In order to stay at an equilibrium, the players must test each other. But capturing their tests opens an alley towards modeling competition, outsmarting, and deceit, which are prominent in the practice of gaming, but often ignored in game theory. We believe that the tools are readily available to tackle this interesting and important aspect of gaming.
Players' randomness testing of each other's plays turned out to be an intuitive characterization of the notion of randomness. It is perhaps worth emphasizing here that the players with different computational powers recognize different notions of randomness. More precisely, different families of programmable functions L induce different detectors, different tests, different notions of randomness, and different implementations for the mixed strategy equilibria. Restricting the family L to the language of regular expressions or finite state machines would give a weak but interesting notion. The detectors could be implemented along the lines of the familiar compression algorithms, such as those due to Lempel, Ziv and Welch [32, 31] . However, since there is no such thing as a universal finite state machine, capable of evaluating all finite state machines, such tests based on regular languages would have to be specified one at a time, and sought ad hoc. In contrast, taking L to be a Turing complete language, such as the language of Turing machines themselves, allows constructing a universal randomness test, which Alice could implement as a universal detector from Sec. 4 . This leads to the canonical notion of randomness spelled out by Kolmogorov, Martin-Löf and Solovay, and characterized in Corollary 5.1. Although the simple dovetailing technique used to construct the universal detector in Corollary 5.1 quickly leads beyond the realm of what is nowadays considered feasible computation, the modern methods of algorithmic learning and statistical induction are nevertheless built upon them [11, 22, 30] . Learning, evolution and gaming are computational processes that do not happen just among humans, but also in nature. Even very slow computations in sufficiently large populations and at sufficiently large time scales produce their results eventually.
